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Abstract-Rule-based expert systems must deal with uncertain data, 
subjective expert opinions, and inaccurate decision rules. Computer scien- 
tists and psychologists have proposed and implemented a number of belief 
and new insights into theu Bayesian interpretations are presented In 
particular, the authors focus on three alternative belief-update models the 
certainty factors calculus, Dempster-Shafer simple support functions, d 
the descriptive contrast/inettia model. Important "dialectsn of these LPk 
guages are shown to be isomorphic to each other and to a speeiel asp d 
Bayesian inference. Parts of this analysis were d e d  out by otkr 
authors; these results were extended and 
technique designed to study the b- d 
I. BELIEF LANGUAGES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
D URING the past decade, computer-based expert sys- tems have emerged to become the most applied facet 
of artificial intelligence (AI). To date, expert systems have 
proven to be particularly effective in &$emm~c tasks, eg 
antimicrobial selection and interpretation of geological 
data (Duda and Shortliffe 1151). Such "domains of exper- 
tise" are typically characterized by uncertain field data, 
subjective expert opinions, and inexact decision rules. n e  
challenge of dealing with these uncertainties has stirred o 
lively debate among developers of expert systems on the 
one hand, and faithful followers of the Bayesiari religion 
on the other. First, the drive to experiment with real expert 
systems has led A1 researchers to implement a d h  uncer- 
tainty mechanisms that are rather limited on normative 
grounds. This, in turn, has drawn criticism from Bayesian 
writers who, nonetheless, were forced to admit that the 
classical methods they preached did not always scale up to 
realistic applications. As the reference section of this paper 
indicates, the result was an inspiring exchange of ideas that 
is currently going strong in many academic circles in 
computer science, statistics, and psychology. 
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Just like any other formal model, an expert system 
imposes a rigid structure on the problem it attempts to 
support. In particular, rule-based systems make the as- 
sumption that expertise can be captured through a modu- 
ka SeiB of hderm~~: rules. These rules are supposed to 
"objective" howledge as well as subjective ex- 
pert opinions. To illustrate, consider the following familiar 
problem. 
A tenured professor (hereafter referred to as a "re- 
cruiter'') attempts to guess the academic potential of a 
candidate to a junior faculty position. The information 
available to the recruiter is the typical mix of resume, 
papers, and recommendaiion letters, along with his own 
pa% recruiting exweace. The review process is compli- 
cated by the fact that many young Ph.D.'s are competing 
for the same slot; therefore, the god of the nxruiter is to 
rank-order the candidates in terms of their prospective 
academic potential. The overall criterion for academic 
success is taken to be the perceived likelihood of the 
prowtion, "the candidate will be offered a tenured posi- 
tion in our department within the next decade." 
A recruiter is said to be an "expert" if his predictions 
consistentIy exhibit a great deal of external validity. To 
make an extreme case, let us assume that our recruiter is a 
perfect predictor: all the candidates that he has recom- 
mended In the past were subsequently offered tenure, and 
all the people that he has rejected were refused tenure in 
similar departments. F~rthennore, our expert is willing to 
describe his proven recruiting rationale in terms of a set of 
inference rules. These rules represent, in his mind, the 
perceived academic significance of various credentials. 
Given this and other relevant information, is there a plau- 
sible model that can credibly synthesize this rule-base into 
a belief about the academic potential of a particular candi- 
date? Can this model be further implemented in a com- 
puter-based system designed to carry out routine screening 
of candidates? These questions must be addressed by de- 
velopers and users of rule-based expert systems. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the creden- 
tials of prospective candidates can be enumerated through 
a finite set of dichotomous propositions { e , ;  - , en) .  For 
example, e ,  might say that the candidate has an under- 
graduate degree in mathematics, and e,  that he has exten- 
sive consulting experience. In a rule-based system, these 
clues are related to various hypotheses through a set of 
0018-9472/89/0900-1106$01.00 01989 IEEE 
I SCHOCKEN AND KLEINDORFER: ART'lFfClAL I W G E N C E  DULECrS OF BAniIAM BELIEF aFYlSION LANGUAGE 1107 
rules, elicited from a recruiting expert. For example, our 
recruiter might suggest that, more often than not, a math 
degree e improves tenure prospects h. This inexact impli- 
cation might be represented as 
I if e then h with degree of belief be1 ( h , ( e ) ) . 
The meaning of the quantitative degree of belief bel(h, { e)) 
in this logical context is an open question, tracing back to 
Carnap's work on inductive logic [7]. It is tempting to give 
these degrees of belief a probabilistic interpretation; 
nonetheless, scores of writers have demonstrated that logic 
and probability do not mix very well. This difficulty, 
combined with the presswe to develop rule-based s p i m s  
that can handle uncertainty, has led to a proliferation of 
incompatible quasi-probabilistic belief ha In this 
paper we review and analyze these languages %Hm a 
Bayesian perspective. Our genera4 qptoacfm is as fa@om: 
given a particular belief languqe, we wish to address three 
questions, related to the syntax, calculus, and semantics, 
I respectively, of the underlying language. 
1) What is the Bayesian interpretation of the number 
bel(h, {e))? 
2) Given a set of degrees of belief bel(h, {elf), - . , 
be1 ( h ,  {e,j) aed a belief eonabinatioa mIe 
C(bel(h, {e,J);..,bel(h, {e,))), what is the 
Bayesian interpretation of this rule? 
3) Do the answers to 1) and 2) place any constrains on 
the scope of inference problems that rule-based 
systems can credibly wive? 
It goes without saying that proper knowledge engineer- 
ing requires that degrees of belief be elicited, computed, 
and interpreted in a credible manner. Beside the normative 
sigruficance of this objective, degrees of belief should be 
handled cautiously since the plausibility of tbe final set of 
hypotheses generated by an expefi system is iypkdy a 
function of the algebraic ranking of their posterior degrees 
of belief. For example, the diae0fi.s program 
internist (Pople [43]) uses the disease with the highest 
ranking degree of belief as an anchor, around which a 
fuzzy subset of plausible hypotheses is defined. Thus, both 
the external as well as the internal validity of an expert 
system are directly related to the validity of its underlying 
belief language. 
Nonetheless, it seems by now that no single belief lan- 
guage exists that will be effective, efficient, and plausible 
for all possible applications and, at the same time, satisfy 
all knowledge engineers, experts, users, and researchers. 
This realization has led to a proliferation of new belief 
languages in the last decade. At the foundation of any of 
these languages lies either a descriptive or a normative 
argument about human judgement under uncertainty. A 
descriptive language attempts to capture the way experts 
actually reason; hence its measure of performance is its 
capability of simulating human judgment. In contrast, a 
normative model is based on the premise that human 
reasoning under uncertainty is often suboptimal; rather 
than attempting to replicate it blindly, the normative ap- 
proach is more concerned with the proximity of the sys- 
tem's judgment to such rigorous standards as logic or 
probability theory. It is well-known by now that normative 
models are not necessarily consistent with descriptive mod- 
els, as has been demonstrated by numerous studies in 
cognitive psychology and in decision sciences. For a good 
discussion of this dichotomy, the reader is referred to 
Baron [4]. 
The classical method for representing and updating de- 
grees of belief is the Bayesian language, which is consistent 
with the axioms of subjective probability. Researchers who 
attempted to implement this method in expert systems, 
however, were quick to discover three major limitations: 
a) standard manipulations of discrete joint distribution 
fmdons  are coqutationaIIy complex (Pearl [a]); b) the 
Bayesian lanmge does not lend itself easily to 
reprm* ambiguity and fuzzy expert opinions (Shafer 
[50])'; and c) human reasoning under uncertainty is sys- 
tematically inconsistent with Bayesian inference (Tversky 
and Kahneman [57]). 
Efforts to curb the inherent limitations of a complete 
Bayesian design have taken several directions. Early expert 
systems such as MYCIN (Shortliffe [53]) and Prospector 
(b& et al. [14]) employed ad hoe belief languages based 
on certainty factors and subjective likelihood ratios, respec- 
tively. The resulting belief-update mechanisms were only 
partially consistent with the axioms of subjective probabil- 
ity. These "first generation" systems gave way to a re- 
newed interest in probability theory, led by Howard's [28] 
work on influence diagrams and Pearl's [40] belief net- 
works. Pearl's methods of propagating probabilities through 
a network of propositions are consistent with standard 
probability theory. In the case of singly connected net- 
works, the run-the of Pearl's algorithm is polinomial with 
the siaR of the network. The problem of probabilistic 
belief-update in a general network has been shown to be 
NP-hard (Copper [Ill). 
Perhaps the most important development in the quest to 
"extend" the Bayesian language is Shafer's work on belief 
functions and the corresponding Dempster rule for com- 
bining them (Shafer [50]). The theory of belief functions 
has a rigorous mathematical foundation based on a relax- 
ation of the additivity axiom of probability theory. The 
resulting Dempster-Shafer language provides explicit tools 
for dealing with ambiguity and "uncommitted belief." 
There has recently been a surge of interest in the Demp- 
ster-Shafer language within the A1 community, and a 
considerable number of expert systems and expert system 
shells already employ this technique (e.g., Baldwin and 
Monk [3]). 
Finally, there have been several attempts in decision 
sciences and cognitive psychology to specify descriptive or 
'?here have been attempts to deal with second-order probability within 
the Bayesian lwuage,  e.g., Pearl (411, Baron IS], and Kyburg [31]. 
"behavioral" belief languages. For example, Einhorn and which has three parts. First, a brief overview of the Ian- 
Hogarth [19] proposed a pragmatic anchoring and adjust- guage is given. Second, a Bayesian interpretation is pre- 
ment belief-update model called the contrast/inertia lan- sented and justified. Third, the mathematical implications 
guage. Such experimental works are typically based on of the interpretation are discussed. A discussion section 
trying to fit a mathematical model that best explains the integrates the preceding results and suggests future re- 
behavior of subjects in a controlled experiment. To the search directions. 
extent that this empirical effort can be extended to model 
the reasoning of successful experts rather than naive sub- . 
jects, this approach clearly merits attention from practi- 11. RULE-BASED INFERENCE UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
tioners of expert systems. 
In the 39743'~~ the deveIopment of new belief languages 
was carried out. primarily by people outside the main- 
stream of the statistics comunity. 7%is b e  of research 
went by and large unnoticed until the 1980's. Sice then, a 
number of faithful B s have begun to defend their 
turf by arguing that wefy new M d  I m b a :  
matched with a plausible probabistic intepretatim. As 
Kyburg [31] puts it, "it is appropriate to examine the 
formal relations between various Bayesian and non-Bayes- 
ian approaches.. . in order to explore the question of 
whether the new techniques are really more powerful than 
the old, and the question sf whether> if they are, this 
increment of power is bought at too high a price." The 
present work is motivated by this b e  of  though^ We wilf 
review previous work and present new results on the 
Bayesian interpretations of important versions of the cer- 
tainty factors, contrast [inertia, and Dempster-Shafer lan- 
guages. 
The paper draws on previous work by Heckennan [26], 
Hajek [251, md Grosof [23]. Most of what we cunaGy 
know about the normative validity of the certainty factors 
language is due to Heckennan's interpretation of certainty 
factors as transformed likelihood ratios. Hajek has also 
investigated the normative validity of alternative belief 
revision calculi, but his point of departure was not proba- 
bilistic at all. He proposed an axiomatic calculus consis* 
of four plausible combination b c t i o m  and went on to 
analyze the algebraic structure 02 the set of degrees af 
belief i n d u d  hry these functions. This analysis led to his 
condusion that ehe certainty factors language and the ad 
hoc Bayesian language used in Prospector induce isomor- 
phic sets of degrees of belief. This isomorphism, however, 
was based on nonprobabilistic algebraic mappings. In this 
paper we take a different approach, as follows. 
The paper commences with a review of rule-based infer- 
ence, the context in which belief languages are used in 
artificial intelligence. A Bayesian language is then pre- 
sented, and its underlying (extraprobabilistic) rationality is 
demonstrated. This is done to motivate our choice of the 
Bayesian language, as opposed to another desiredata (e.g., 
Hajek's), as a standard against which other belief lan- 
guages will be compared. We then present an analytic 
methodology, which, lacking a better name, is termed 
dialectal analysis. This set of tools, designed to investigate 
the kinship to two or more belief language, is then used to 
describe the implicit relationships among the certainty 
The two major building blocks of an expert system are 
the knowledge base and the inference engine. The knowl- 
edge-buse is conceptually a directed graph consisting of 
propositional nodes and inferential arcs. The boundary of 
the graph consists of a set of competing hypotheses (e.g., 
diseases in a medical diagnosis application) and a set of 
observable cfuaq (e-g, diagnostic symptoms). Inner nodes 
represent subgptheses (e.g., clinical syndromes). The di- 
rected arc connecting nodes e and h represents a direct 
inferential relationship between e and h, and the arc's 
label is the strength of this relationship, or the degree of 
belief, be1 (h, e).2 
The inference engine is a search algorithm that prunes 
this evidential network and applies modus ponens repeti- 
tively. One difference between this and standard theorem 
proving stems from the uncertainty associated with rules: 
as the inference engine prunes rules that ultimately imply a 
hypothesis, a belief calculus is applied to update the poste- 
rior belief in this hypothesis. This noncategorical reasoning 
process terminates when the belief in one or more hy- 
potheses exceeds a certain predefined cutoff value. At least 
in theory, this value should be based on the cost of 
gatheririg additional evidence and on the consequences of 
committing type I and I1 errors. 
The preceding paragraph emphasizes the central role 
that belief calculi play in noncategorical rule-based infer- 
earn. A m r b g  to Shafer and Tversky [51], the building 
blacks of a belief language are syntax, calculus, and se- 
mantics. In the context of this paper, we define syntax to 
be the set of all degrees of belief that are relevant to a 
particular 21pt;hesis R. Typically, a set of atomic degrees 
of belief bel(h, {e,)); - -, bel(h, (e,3) is elicited directly 
from a human expert, while compound degrees of belief 
are computed ad hoc through a set of operators collec- 
tively known as a belief calculus. 
A completely specified rule-based belief calculus must 
consist of five combination functions: parellel combinatioxi 
(combining the degrees of belief rendered by two or more 
independent rules), sequential combination (combining the 
rule's degeree of belief with the uncertainty associated with 
the rule's antecedent), and three logical combination func- 
tions (for negations, &junctions and conjunctions of un- 
certain pieces of evidence). In this paper we focus on 
parallel combination only. 
With regard to semantics, we take the position that the 
semantics of a particular belief language is given in terms 
factors, contrast/inertia, and ~em~s te r -~ha fe r  languages. 
Each of these languages is discussed in a separate section 'From now on, the notation bel(h,e) is shorthand for bel(h,(e)). 
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of a mapping from the syntax and calculus dimensions of 
the language onto the theory of subjective probability. To 
the extent that the latter theory is taken to be a norm for 
rationality, this mapping provides normative validity to the 
syntax and calculus dimensions of the belief langauge in 
question. 
It is reasonable to assume that any rule-based belief 
calculus with be founded on some parameterized variant of 
the following model: 
The single-place degree of belief bel(h), which is a 
shorthand of W ( h ,  ?B), ~epreseats prior belief, i.e., unwn- 
ditional belief k a hypa 
evidence. For example, 
belief in the tenure p 
ment) of a random dr 
Ph.D's. The degree of belief bel(h, e,) measures the degree 
of support that the clue e, renders to the hypothesis h. 
Depending on the underlying belief language, this eviden- 
tial relationship might take two forms. Under a diagnostic 
mode of inference, bel(h, e) parameterizes the rul 
THEN h) and rep the expert's belief in the lik 
of h in light of the supporting evidence e. Under a na~sal 
interpretation, bel(h., e )  paramet* the ruJe (IF h THEN 
e), representing the degree of belief in the effect e occur- 
ring given its retrospective cause h. The direction of infer- 
ence in rules varies across belief languages, and we there- 
fore leave it unspecified at the abstract level of (1). Finally, 
given a set of evidence E = {e,; . . , en), the posterior 
belief in h in E&t s f  E Is ted by the belief synthesis 
operator C. 
Depending on the properties of C, it is some&bes 
possible to M:VJB~& be1 recursively, making k an anchoring- 
and-adjustment belief-update model: 
Focusing on some intuitive properties of belief-update, we 
might require that belbe commutative, i.e., 
and associative, i.e., 
These properties are quite plausible on rational grounds; 
we wouldn't like a physician to change his diagnosis sim- 
ply because the order by which information is presented to 
him is altered. In general, one is free to construct an 
axiomatic desiderata regarding the intuitive properties of 
bel, using it further to evaluate formal belief languages. 
Such an approach was undertaken by Cox [12], Savage 
1471, Popper [#I, and, most recently, Horvitz et al, [27]. 
For example, Cox ent~rnerated seven intuitive properties of 
belief-update and proceeded to prove that the resulting 
belfunction is a probability. By augmenting Cox's frame- 
work with three additional intuitive properties, Horvitz et 
al. have shown that any belief-update measure that satis- 
fies the extended fr~mework must be equal to some mono- 
tonic transformation of a likelihood-ratio. 
Note that the belief-update model (1) is neither "good" 
in any philosophical sense, nor does it reflect any plausible 
desiderata. At the same time, the general form of (1) is 
largely dictated by the rule-based architecture, which as- 
sumes that a) wholistic expert knowledge can be decom- 
posed into a finite series of discrete observations (rules), 
d b) fbag. subsets of this %nowledge-base can be synthe- 
sized or "rolled back" ints posterior beliefs. Suppose that 
we accept a) and b) as reasonable restrictions on the subset 
on inference problems to be studied. Can we define this 
subset more precisely? is it true that different belief lan- 
guages are capable of modeling different subsets of infer- 
ence problems? These questions will be addressed in what 
fsltows. 
The term inference problem introduced in the last para- 
graph refers to an ordered set of propositions, say 
(h, el,- . -, en), in which h and {el; . -, en} are interpreted - 
as a hypothesis and relevant body of evidence, respec- 
tively. Given this terminology, the "solution" of an infer- 
ence problem refers to the correct Bayesian computation 
of the posterior belief in h in light of {el,. - . , en ). From a 
probabilistic standpoint, { h, el,. - -, en) is viewed as a space 
of dichotsmous random variables, characterized by a joint 
distribution function P: W - ,  [O, 11 where W is the set of 
2"+1 b d w  pernutations defied over the space. Under 
this Bayesian interpretation, the ultimate goal of the infer- 
ence process is to wmpute the posterior probability 
P(h)el,. - .,en). It is easy to see, however, that any brute- 
force attempt to compute this conditional probability from 
the joint distribution function P(h, el; . -, en) is bound to 
be exponential in n. 
The preceding paragraph assumes that P is known. In 
reality, this is clearly not the case. For example, the 
inference problem (h, el,. -, en)' might represent the infer- 
ential relationships that exist between, say, a hidden oil 
deposit h and its geological manifestations {el,- - . , en). 
Clearly, complete knowledge of the joint distribution func- 
tion P(*) will rarely be credibly available and P(.) will 
have to be generated piecemeal using partial data and 
subjective expert judgment. At the same time, the elusive P 
might serve as a mechanism for defining classes of infer- 
ence problems which vary in terms of their computational 
complexity. This is motivated by the notion that the cogni- 
tive complexity of an inference problem has something to 
do with the mathematical modularity of its underlying P. 
With that in mind, the following P characterization of 
inference problems is of special interest, as will be seen 
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shortly: 
Ratio-Form Conditionally Independent Problems: An in- 
ference problem (h, el;. ., en) is said to be ratio-form 
conditionally independent (Grosof (231) if 
Many writers have haphazardly read (3) to imply that 
5,; . ., en are conditionally independent given both h and 
h.3 Clearly, (3) reflects a weaker notion of modularity 
which is neeessaq but not sufficient for the latter asser- 
tion. 
We now turn to describe a we11-horn version of the 
Bayesian language that is limited to ratio-form condition- 
ally independent problems. This language is used as a 
standard against which other belief languages will be com- 
pared. This strategy (as opposed to formulating a desire- 
data) is based on the premise that the Bayesian belief- 
update model has extraprob tena~& of rationality 
that cannot be debated by a reasonable person. We bpe  
that the following section will help to convince skeptical 
readers that this is indeed true. 
Before delving into this discussion, we take the liberty of 
confining the analysis to inference problems (h, {el,e2}) 
consisting of one hypothesis and two pieces of evidence. 
All the findings reported here can be easily extended to 
any finite number of pieces of evidence, as long as they are 
all directly connected to the single hypoahesis in question. 
The inclusion of intermediate hypotheses 
tational problems which normally require heuristics and/or 
very restrictive assumptions on the underlying joint distri- 
bution function. Bayesian inference in complex networks is 
a challenging and active research area and the interested 
reader is referred to Chee er /33), Cooper 
[la], Pearl [40), and Shenoy and W%;r [521. 
Degrees of belief in the ratio-form Bayesian language 
are expressed in terms of odds and likelihood ratios: the 
posterior belief in a hypothesis h in light of E = {el, e,) is 
the odds bel(h, E )  = P(~~E) /P (&IE) ,  P being a standard 
subjective probability. The degree of belief in the causal 
rule (if h then e) is represented through the conditional 
likelihood ratio ~(elh)/P(el&). With that in mind, the 
Bayesian calculus is viewed as a mechanism designed to 
synthesize a set of causal degrees of belief into a combined 
posterior belief, The remainder of this section presents the 
derivation of this calculus. Similar derivations were carried 
out in numerous papers in decision theory and in AI, e.g., 
Peirce [42], Edwards et al. 1171, and Charniak [8]. 
A. Derivation of the Bayesian Calculus 
We begin with Bayes rule, applied to both P(hlel,e2) 
and p(&le1, e,): 
Dividing (4) by (5) gives the odds-ratio version of Bayes 
rule: 
Now, if the problem (h, el, e,) is ratio-form condition- 
ally independent, (Grosof, [23]) (6) reduces to the following 
definition of the Bayesian calcdw: 
or, using a simplified notation, 
R(hlel,e2) = ~(e,lh).L(e,lh).R(h). (7) 
The e ~ n a t i o n  of the joint distribution of evidence 
P(e,, e,) in the step from (4) and (5) to (6) has important 
practical implications First, the elicitation of any joint 
distribution function is a painstaking undertaking which 
should be avoided whenever possible. Second, (6) is com- 
pletefy independent of the degree of uncertainty associated 
with the evidence E = {el, e,): if a clue e is uncertain, i.e., 
P(e) (1, this uncertainty is as relevant to h as it is to %, 
and therefore it can be canceled out. Finally, the elimina- 
tion of P(el,e2) gives the knowledge engineer a wide 
choice of elicitation techniques, as any one of the following 
measures might be used to parameterize the evidential 
support that e renders to h: the pair of probabilities 
(P{e]h), ~ ( e ) % ) ) ,  the likelihood ratio ~ ( e l h ) / ~ ( e P ) ,  or
the betting odds O(hie)/O(h) = (P(hle)/P(hle))/ 
( ~ ( h ) / ~ ( 6 ) ) .  The latter two expressions are equivalent, 
and any one of them can be derived from the former. This 
variety is important, as different applications and different 
experts might prefer one elicitation method over the other. 
We now turn to discuss some nonmathematical proper- 
ties of rationality that are consistent with the Bayesian 
calculus (Cl). 
B. On the Underlying Rationality of the Bayesian Language 
The subjective4 school of probability (e.g., Ramsey [46]) 
is based on the argument that the semantic interpretation 
of probability can be given in terms of rational human 
judgment under uncertainty. Proponents of this school of 
thought argued vigorously and quite convincingly that any 
3 hereafter denotes "not h." 
'~lso referred to as Bayesian or personal school of probability (e.g., 
Rarnsey [46D. 
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other interpretation of probability is merely a special case 
of the subjective philosophy (de Finetti 1131). As Savage 
[47, p. 671 puts it, "the personalistic view incorporates all 
the universally acceptable criteria for reasonableness in 
judgment known to me.. . when any criteria that may have 
been overlooked are brought forward, they will be wel- 
comed into the personalistic view." 
Following Savages's line of thought, we wish to show 
that, given some plausible interpretations, important "di- 
alects" of new belief languages are indeed special cases of 
the classical Bayesian language. The latter language is 
considered a gold standard because, normatively speaking, 
it is consistent with many intuitive principles of rational 
of these principles, which are all consis- 
tent with (CP), are discussed Mow, In wbaf f d o m ,  a 
human (or mechanized) agent who behaves in accordance 
with (Cl) is called a Bayesian judge. A human agent who 
entertains an abstract belief-update &el which may or 
may not be related to (CZ) Is called a b a n  judge. 
Proper Synthesis of Degrees of Beliefi The tendency of 
human judges to underweight or ignore base-rate informa- 
tion is a well-known manifestation of the representativeness 
bias (Tversky and Kahneman 1571). For example, consider 
a candidate for a junior faculty position who already has 
several major publications under his belt. We argue W 
the fact that the candidate is a prolific Wn:m ( e )  might 
cause a human judge to overestimate Bis future tenure 
prospects (h). This overoptimism occurs either by misin- 
terpreting ~ ( e ] h ) / ~ ( e l & )  to be ~ ( h l e ) / ~ ( h l e ) ,  or by 
letting a high and salient diagnostic impact ~ ( e l h ) / ~ ( e l & )  
to overshadow the "dull" background information that 
only, say, 20 percent of aeW recruits are ultimately pro- 
moted to tenure. 
This bias will not distract a Bayesian yudge who adhere? 
to (Cl), where the base-rate information P(h)/P(h) is 
explicitly represented and carries tbie same weight as 
P (  e 1 h ) / ~ ( e  1 h ). Furehemore, (Cl) L both comutawve 
and associative, meaning that the evidential impact of 
clues is independent of order and clustering effects. This is 
in sharp contrast to human judgment that is prone to such 
belief synthesis biases as primacy effect (Anderson [2]) 
recency effect (Lopes [35]), misinterpretation of new evi- 
dence (Nisbett and Ross [37]), conservatism (Edwards 
[16]), and a host of other "averaging" rules that violate 
(Cl) (Slovic and Lichtenstein [54]). 
Fusion of Quantitative and Qualitative Euidence: The for- 
mation of a posterior belief in an uncertain hypothesis 
typically requires a joint consideration of factual informa- 
tion as well as subjective opinions. For example, consider 
the two propositions proiific researcher el and good teacher 
(e,). A Bayesian inference system that evaluates tmure 
prospects (h) will have lo use, among other things, the 
probabilities P(e,Jh ) and P(e2jh). Where do these num- 
bers come from? The probability that a tenured professor 
is a prolific researcher can be obtained in a frequentist 
fashion, counting the number of prolific researchers among 
a known sample of tenured professors. Teaching ability 
ma) be a more elusive property, and the probability 
I 
P(e21h) can be elicited as a "personal" degree of belief, 
using a domain expert. According to the subjective school 
of probability, the scope of rational values that the fre- 
quentist P(ellh) and the subjective P(e21h) may attain is 
constrained by the same set of axioms. Due to this uni- 
formity, the Bayesian language provides a homogeneous 
framework in which stochastic and epistemic degrees of 
belief are combined through the same calculus. 
Equal Attention to Positive and Negative Euidence: Hu- 
man judges who are left to their own devices are known 
consistently to seek and overweigh supportive evidence at 
the expense of neglecting or underestimating negative clues 
(Koriat et al. [30]). At the same time, a knowledge engineer 
who is guided by (Cl) is forced to discount supportive 
belief of the form P(e1h) with its negative complementary 
belief ~ { e j & ) .  Fw example, the impact of a good record of 
publications (e) on tenure prospects (h) is automatically 
discourired by the observation that good research is also 
produced by ommured candidates ( ~ ( e l x )  > 0). In other 
words, (Cl) forces the Bayesian judge to "dilute" his belief 
P(elh) with the complementary belief ~ ( e l h ) ;  said other- 
wise, if (Cl) is transformed into a log-linear scoring for- 
mula, both P(e1h) and ~ ( e l z )  will have the same (unit) 
"coefficient of importance" in the resulting model. Cogni- 
tive &stor~om of the "dilution effect" were discussed by 
Nisktt et al. i381. 
The More Information, the Better: A close examination 
of (Cl) reveals that the Bayesian calculus is consistent with 
the commonly held principle that data (pieces of evidence) 
should never be thrown away. More precisely, Savage [47, 
p. 481 has shown that for n sufficiently large, the probabil- 
ity, given that h is true, that the likelihood-ratios product 
L(e,(h).; a ,  .L(e,lh) (as in (7)) is greater than any preas- 
signed a m b e r  is almost one, i.e., 
for 0 < c < ao, barring two banal exceptions. Our interpre- 
tation of this beautiful theorem is that the Bayesian judge 
becomes wiser as he goes along in his judicious search for 
relevant information: as more and more balanced and 
nonredundant evidence is brought to bear, the posterior 
belief in any hypothesis approaches certainty (through 
(Cl)), provided that this hypothesis is indeed true. It is 
trivial to show that this holds for any nonzero prior belief 
in the hypothesis; in that respect, the theorem also con- 
firms that a rational person is a pragmatic learner. Regard- 
less of how little belief s/he initially holds in an unpopular 
truth, e.g, that jogging is bad for one's health, s/he is 
willing to change that opinion freely as new information 
becomes available. 
Explicit Treatment of Conditional Independence: The 
Bayesian language offers a rich variety of tools for de- 
tecting, representing, and dealing with correlated evi- 
dence. For example, it is easy to show that any one 
of the following three assertions implies the other 
two: 1) P(ellh, e2) = P(e,lh); 2) P(e21h, el) = P(e21h): 
3) P(el,e21h) = P(e,lh).P(e21h). The equivalence of 1) 
and 2) implies that the assertion "given h, knowing el 
does not change my belief in e," is symmetric with respect 
to el  and e, as we would have expected. The equivalence 
of 1) and 3) implies that either 1) or 2) is consistent with 
the classical definition of statistical independence. Note, 
however, that either 1) or 2) is preferred to 3) from a 
cognitive standpoint: each conveys a better understanding 
of the notion of independence, and together they offer two 
cognitively different but mathematically equivalent tech- 
niques to elicit the same phenomenon. Hence Bayesian 
knowledge engineers who seek to detect correlated evi- 
dence might use 1 )  and 2) either separately or in tandem. 
This provides a richer language for knowledge acquisition 
and a simple means for cross-vcerification of human inputs. 
In the event that some piem of evidence are correlated 
(with respect to either h or to 6), (Cl) becomes invalid on 
normative grounds. Several authors, e.g., Charniak [8] and 
Pearl [40], pr heuristic te@&ques to 
correlated inference networks into equivalent (but not 
identical) networks in which some vwsdon of (C1) might be 
applied. As this line of research is quite new, these tech- 
niques are somewhat limited. At the same time, statistical 
dependency is a prevailing feature of nature that cannot be 
swept under the rug. It is therefore fortunate that the 
Bayesian language provides a powerful arsenal of tools for 
expressing &is phenomenon and dealing with it explicitly. 
Compatibility with Decision T k 0 9 :  Aside from its com- 
pliance with rational judgment, the Bayesian language is 
syntactically compatible with many models that may be 
used in the context of expert systems. For example, Raiffa's 
[45] value-of-information analysis attempts to pursue the 
"most valuable" clue, i-e., the clue with the (anticipated) 
maximal diagnostic h p x t  on current belief. In a similar 
vein, LangEstz el a!. f321 pow& a daision bhwretic 
extension to rule-based reasoning, in which utility eonsid- 
erations serve to evaluate the merit of potential search 
paths in a rule-based inference net. There exist numerous 
other areas in which A1 and decision theory might benefit 
greatly from each other. To reap such benefits, though, 
both disciplines have to speak in the m e  language. In this 
regard it is worth noting that practically a11 the work in 
prescriptive decision theory is. already cast in terms of the 
Bayesian language. Hence this language would be a prag- 
matic starting point for a comparative analysis. 
In summary, perhaps the reader is by now convinced 
that (Cl) has more to it than at first appears. From a 
technical standpoint, Bayes rule is a trivial exercise in set 
theory, given the axioms of subjective probability. These 
axioms, however, can be nontrivially derived from rational 
behavior under uncertainty (Cox [12], de Finetti [13], Sav- 
age [47]). Thus the epistemological interpretation of Bayes 
rule and its implications on judgment, learning, and expe- 
rience. This dichotomy is clearly a manifestation of the 
Janus face of probability: "on the one side it is statistical, 
concerning itself with stochastic laws of chance processes. 
On the other side it is epistemological, dedicated to assess- 
ing degrees of belief in propositions quite devoid of statis- 
tical background" (Hacking [24, p. 121). 
We conclude this section with a formal definition of the 
(ratio-form conditionally independent) Bayesian language, 
which plays a central role in what follows. I 
Definition I :  Let LBayes be the belief language whose 
syntax consists of likelihood ratios of the form P(elh)/ 
~ ( e l h )  and whose calculus is (Cl). I 
Thus we focus on an inference context in which causal 
rules of the form h -, e are parameterized by likelihood 
ratios of the form  el h) /~(e lg) .  Furthermore, we as- 
sume that these degrees of belief are combined through 
Bayes rule (Cl). Since (Cl) is restricted to ratio-form 
conditionally independent inference problems, L,,,, is a 
special case of a more general Bayesian language. To avoid 
clutter, though, we will refer below to LBaye, as the Bayesian 
lmguage. We will comment later on the restrictiveness of 
this language. 
N. CTAL ANALYSIS I 
The previous section was meant to serve as a motivation 
for adopting the Bayesian language LBayes as a standard 
against which other belief languages will be judged. This 
analysis will be carried out within a methodological frame- 
work described in this section. The following terminology 
b used throughout: let L, = (bel,, C,), i E {1,2), be two 
belief language. bel, denotes the syntax (set of degrees of 
belief) of Li, and Cj. denotes the L, calculus, i.e., an 
operator C, : bel, -, bel, defined over and into the L, de- 
grees of belief. 
Definition 2: If the syntax of L, is identical to the 
syntax of L2 and the calculus of L, is a special case of the 
calculus of L,, L, is said to be a dialect of L,. I 
Definition 3: Let T be a mapping T: bell -+ bel,. If 
T(be1,) = bet, implies that C,(T(bel,)) = Cl(bell), then we 
say that L, is isomorphic to L, under T and denote it 
i s4  4, L,),. 
Definition 4: In general, we call a mapping T: bell + bel, 
T: L, + L,. If L, is the Bayesian language, T is called a 
I an interpretation of L2 and denote this interpretation , 
Bayesian interpretation of L,. 
Corollary I:  For any three belief languages L,, L,, L, 
and interpretations TI :  L,-, L, and T2: L,+ L,, the 
following is true: 
1) iso (L,, L,) where I is the identity mapping I(be1,) 
= bell 
2) if iso (L, ,  L,),, and iso ( L , ,  L3),, then 
isO(Ll, L3)72eT1 
3) if T-' exists uniquely then iso (L,, L,), if and only 
if iso (L,, L 1 ) T - ~  
Definitions 2-4 and Corollary 1 provide a general 
framework for investigating implicit relationships between 
two or more belief languages. Given two languages L, and 
L,, the basic idea is to try to give L2 a meaning T using 
thq S - W - ~ ~ ~ C S  of rdl. If an isomorphism emerges and, 
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furthermore, the meaning T "makes sense," we argue that 
L, is a special or a "disguised" case of L,. This exercise is 
carried out as follows: first, one inspects the degrees of 
belief of L, and tries to define them in terms of the Ll 
syntax using some function T: bell + be],. In the next 
stage, one carries out this very interpretation throughout 
L,'s calculus C,, replacing every occurrence of {bel,) in 
the definition of C, with its corresponding degree of belief 
(T(be1,)). The objectiw.: here is to obtain a mathematical 
expression which has a calculus-cal meaning within L,. 
Ideally, this expression can be shown to be equivalent to 
the L, calculus, in which case L, is said to be isomorphic 
to L, under the interpretation T. Multilingual relation- 
ships may be established thrmgb Corollary 7 .  
This technique is used extensively in tfie next three 
sections to investigate the kinship of the &3tsian, the 
certainty factors, the contrast/inertia, and the Dempster- 
Shafer languages. 
(jointly referred to as CF's) is elicited directly from a 
domain expert. The combined, net increased belief in h in 
light of E = {el,e2} is computed through the following 
calculus : 
'MB (hie,)+ ~ B ( h l e , ) . ( l -  MB (hle,)), 
if both CF's are positive (C2a) 
~ ~ ( h l e ~ ) + M D ( h l e 2 ) . ( 1 -  MD(hIe,)), 
if both CF's are negative. (C2b) 
MB (Ale,) - MD (hie,) 
I-& (MB (hie,), Ml) (hie,)) ' 
\ if tFrrt CFs have mixed signs (C2c) 
An inspection of (C2) reveals that the CF calculus is 
commutative and associative. Hence (C2) might be applied 
recursively to compute the compound evidential impact of 
any finitk set of clues {e1;..,e,), using an adjustment 
and anchoring model simiIar to (2). Note also that both 
The certainty factors (CF) Impage was conceived and tC2a) and ( ~ 2 b )  appear to convey an (additive) rational 
implemented as part of the seminal Mycin project, an sense: if yon open the parentheses of either (C2a) or (C2b), 
AI-based medical diagnosis system developed by Shortliffe you obtain the sum 01 CF(hlel) and CF(h(e,) minus some 
1531 and his colleagues at Stanford University. Following sort of a multiplicative interaction effect: 
the  subsequent popularity of the general-purpose Emycin 
(Van Melle 1581) and the M.1 rule-based architectures, the CFfhIe,,e,) = CF(hle,)+CF(hIe,) 
k~ languagd became the de jacto belief language of most -CF(hlel).CF(hle,). (8) 
applied expert systems in a survey conducted by Harmon 
and King [39], seven of t&e eight expert system "&ells9' 
that supported uncertainty management were based on the 
CF model. Over the past few years, these development 
tools have generated numerous expert systems, and many 
of these are thus based on some version of the CF lan- 
guage. 
The developmar of the C F  language as an alternative to 
Bayesian inference was originally justifiedt on mrmative as 
uell as on practical grounds. From a philosophid stand- 
point, the certainty factor CF(hje) is rewiniscent of 
Carnap's [7] confirmation function C(h,e), designed to 
measure the degree of 1ogicaI entailment associated with 
the inexact implication e + h. In the rule-based architec- 
ture, CF's are used to parameterize diagnostic rules of the 
form (IF e THEN h), This type of forward reasoning (i.e., 
from effects to causes) is widely practiced by knowledge 
engineers and developers of existing expert systems. 
Unlike the Bayesian language, the CF calculus operates 
on relative rather than absolute degrees of belief. It is 
assumed that, most of the time, there exist several pieces of 
evidence that increase and decrease one's belief in a hy- 
pothesis simultaneously. In the additive CF syntax, 
MB(h le) ( MD( h le)) represents the increased belief (disbe- 
lien in the hypothesis h rendered by the e, with 0 9  
MB. MD 91 and MB. MD = 0. If e is irrelevant to 
h ,  AIB(h1e) = MD(h1e) = 0. The extreme case of e being 
sufficiently convincing to confirm (disconfirm) h in cer- 
tainty is modeled through MB = 1 and MD = 0 (MB = 0 
and MD = 1). Normally, a set of atomic MB's and MD's 
Now contrast this with the following logarithmic transfor- 
mation of the Bayesian calculus (7): 
l o g ~ ( h \ e , ,  e,)-log R(h)  = log ~ ( e , ( h )  +log ~ ( e , ( h ) .  
(9) 
We see that the diagnostic CF combination rule (8) is 
remarkably similar to its Bayesian causal counterpart (9). 
First, reed that CF(ir(e,, e,) is defined as the (possibly 
d belief in h due to {el, e2),  which is 
precisely what we find on the left side of (9). Second, the 
right sides of (8) and (9) are also similar, excluding the 
presence of CF(hle,).CF(hle,) in the latter. This "inter- 
action factor" can be viewed as and ad hoc compensation 
for double-counting correlated evidence in the CF calcu- 
lus. Given this rationale, the absence of an interaction 
effect in L,,,, makes sense, as L,,,, is explicitly con- 
fined to ratio-form conditionally independent inference 
problems which are free of interaction effects. This obser- 
vation might lead to the deceptive impression that the CF 
language accounts for interaction effects while L,,,,, does 
not, and consequently, that the CF language is less re- 
stricted than the Bayesian language. As will be discussed 
shortly, this impression is false. 
The similarity of the CF and the Bayesian languages is 
also reflected in their treatment of the state of insufficient 
reason (Savage 1471). In the CF language, a hypothesis h 
which is backed by no clues is assigned a "prior" certainty 
factor of zero, i.e., C F ( ~ (  0 ) = 0. When a clue e becomes 
available, the posterior belief in h undergoes a trivial 
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update, as follows: creased belief in h due to E, and b) the increased disbelief 
in h due to E. If E consists of a single fact, at least one of b e l ( h l e ) = ~ + ~ ~ ( h l ~ ) - ~ ' ~ ~ ( ~ l ~ ) = ~ ~ ( ~ l ~ ) .  (lo) these numbers must be zero. If E is a diverse body of 
In the classical Bayesian language (and following 
Laplace), the lack of any prior evidence on h may be 
modeled by assigning equal odds on h and on h, yielding 
P(h)/P(h) = 1.' Hence the Bayesian counterpart of (10) is 
Consequently, we see that both languages have an iso- 
morphic interpretation of the state of insufficient reason: 
the neutral degree of belief in the additive CF language is 
zero, while its counterpart in the multiplicative odds-ratio 
Bayesian language is ow. The exact nature of this isomor- 
phism will become clearer in the next ses.tion. 
For a detailed description of the CF language, the 
reader is referred to Buchanan and Shortliffe [6].  In the 
present paper we restrict our attention to a dialect of this 
language, defined as follows. 
Definirion 5: Let LC, be the Ianguage whose syntax 
consists of pairs ( M B ,  MD) and whose calculus colasists 
of (C2a) and (C2b). In what faBows, LcF is somefiaBes 
referred to as the two-valued CF language. 
evidence, both numbers may be strictly positive. ~ef ined 
that way, LC, allows us to simultaneously track the im- 
pact of negative and positive evidence on each hypothesis. 
A. Bayesian Interpretation to the CF Language 
There have been several attempts to justify the CF 
syntax on Bayesian grounds. The formulae given below 
were originally proposed by Shortliffe [53] as an ex-post 
Bayesian interpretation of certainty factors. This widely 
quoted mapping is defined as follows: 
(P(hle),  P ( h )  f - P(h)  
= \  1 - P ( h )  , otherwise 
We see &a? the major difference between the commonly = ( min (P(hle),  P ( h ) )  - P ( h )  
, otherwise. 
used CF language and LcF is the exclusion of the combi- 
nation rule for mixed evidence (C2c) in the latter. Equa- - P ( h )  
tion (C2c) was added ad hoc to the CF language to (Tlb) 
improve the computational efficiency of Mycin (Van Melle 
[58j) and is of little interest here. In fact, it is easy to create 
examples in which (C2c) does not make sense. To illus- 
trate, consider Sue Ellen and Cliff, who were two suspects 
in shooting J .  R, Assume that Sue EIlen and Cliff sstmd in 
line to inherit $900000 a d  3808000, respectively, from 
J. R.'s estate. We represent this information (quite crudely) 
by assigning MB(Sue Ellen) = 0.8 and MB(Cliff) = 0.9, 
where MB(x) is the degree of support in the hypothesis "x 
shot J. R." Now, suppose that we further learn that J. R 
had owed Cliff $500000, and that this loan was to be 
terminated upon J. R.'s death. This new piece of evidence 
must decrease our suspicion in Cliff, and we therefore 
assign MD(C1iff) = 0.5. It turns out, however, that accord- 
ing to (C~C) ,  the pooled evidence suggests that Sue Ellen 
and Cliff are equal suspects, with ~ ~ ( ~ u e : ~ l l e n )  = 
CF(Cliff) = 0.8. 
This example is admittedly crude, bllt it does demon- 
strate that (C2c) is a problematic evidence-pooling opera- 
tor. We thus prefer to focus on a "simpler" language LC,, 
in which the belief in any proposition h in the face of 
mixed evidence E (consisting of positive and negative 
pieces of evidence) is represented by a pair of numbers 
CF(h(E)  = (MB(h/E), MD(h1E)) describing a) the in- 
Under the (TI) mapping, the CF o l d u s  (C2) is viewed 
as a belief calculus that operaits on normalized differences 
in probabilities rather than on absolute probabilities. For 
example, P l a )  represents the increased belief in h in light 
of e as a normalized difference between the posterior 
P(hie) and the prior P(h), P taken to be a probability. 
Before proceeding with dialectal analysis, we first have 
to clean up (TI) to make it a well-defined mapping from 
L,,,, to the two-valued LC,. This mapping ought to map 
Bayesian likebod-ratios of the form ~ ( e { h ) / ~ ( e [ h )  on 
pairs of numbers CF(hfe) = (MB(hle), MD(hle)), one of 
which must be zero (a single piece of evidence e cannot 
support and negate h simultaneously). We thus fix (TI) as 
follows: 
 his equal spread of belief in the face of insufficient reason was (T2) 
criticized by Shafer [50]. Shafer proposed a subadditive belief function, in N~~~ in passing that (7-2) is not unique because it must 
which the beliefs in a hypothesis and its negation do not necessarily sum 
to one. See Section VII. be parameterized by the Bayesian prior belief P(h). It is 
therefore appropriate to denote the mapping as follows: Lemma 2: The Bayesian interpretation (T2) transforms 
P (  elh) the MB-combination rule (C2a) into the following Bayesian 
(1"2) ~ ( h )  : -
p(elQ 
- ( M ~ ( h / e ) ,  MD(hle)). (12) belief-update model: 
It is easy to show that (TI) and (T2) are equivalent, 
excluding the cases of P(h)  = 0 and P(h) = 1 which are . * r  
undefined in the latter. This can be easily added to (T2), 
but we leave it out to avoid clutter. Also, for the sake of Proof: It is easy to verify that the Bayesian interpreta- 
brevity, when we refer to (T2) from now on, we will only tion (T2) implies that MB(h1e) = - ~ ~ ( z l e ) .  This fact, 
discuss the positive part of the pair (MB, Ma>.  Thus together with Lemma 1, completes the proof. 
will be technically referred to as a single-valued mapping, Theorem I: LC- is isomorphic to LBayei under the 
remembering that the second value of its image is always Bayesian interpretation (T2). 
zero. Pro08 From Lemmas 1 and 2, (T2) maps the CF 
3. Implications calculus on the joint application of (13) and (14). By dividing the former by the latter, the Bayesian calculus 
In his probabilistic analysis of certainty factors was (C1) emerges. Hence LcF is isomorphic to L,,, under 
camed out by Adams [I], has shown rhat the CF calculus In). 
makes implicit assumptions of csarditioaaf hdwcb:ae. 
Following Adams' work, Heckerman [26] pointed out that VII. THE CONTRAST/~NERTIA LANGUAGE 
the Bayesian transformation of the CF calculus (C2) under 
the mapping (TI) is sensitive to the order in which evi- Einhorn and Hogarth I191 proposed a sequential anchor- 
dence is being combined, and Schocken f48j observed that ing-and-adjustment model called the contrast/inertia (CI) 
the culprit of this blunder is (C2c). Order effects are language. This model is strictly descriptive in the sense 
clearly an undesirable property sf rule-based inference, in that it tries to predict how ordinary people actually be- 
which the order that rules "fire" is supposed to have no have, rather than prescribe how a rational person ought to 
impact on the posterior belief in the underlying hypothesis. behave. The model is based on the premise that positive 
To remedy this d other problems in the CF language, and negative clues are not treated equally by human judges; 
Heckerman proposed a revised interpretation of certainty rather, humans tend to discount the impact of negative 
factors. He then went on to show that the revised interpre- evidence and inflate the impact of supportive evidence. 
tation implies that the CF language is equivalent to an These assumptions are consistent with the previous experi- 
odds-ratio version of the Bayesian language. mental work in cognitive psychology, e.g., Snyder and 
In this paper we stick to the original interpretation of Swann 1551. In the CI syntax, Sk stands for the posterior 
certainty factors (TI) or, more precisely, (n), and proceed belief in a certain hypothesis after k pieces of evidence 
to show that, under this mapping, LC, is isomorphic to have been brought to bear. As additional clues become 
L,,,,,. The following lemmas are largely equivalent to available, this degree of belief is modified through an 
Adams' analysis which was rather informal. We feel order-sensitive anchoring and adjustment process. 
1 that recasting these in the f r a e w ~ r k  of dialect4 Suppose that at step k - 1, one holds a belief Sk-, in a 
analysis serves to clarify the implicit relationship between hypothesis h. At step k a new clue relevant to h is brought 
LC, and L,,,,,. For the sake of brevity, ody the m ~ e s  to b m .  A clue which decreases (increases) the belief in h 
of the proofs are given. is called negative (positive) evidence and denoted a, (b,). Given this nomenclature, the contrast/inertia calculus is 
Lemma 1: The Bayesian interpretation (T2) transforms defined as 
the MD-combination rule (C2b) into the following 
Baqesian belief-update model: S k  = Sk-l - wk.gl(ak) (15) 
Proof (Adams [I]): Recall that the MD-combination 
rule (C2b) is designed to combine two negative pieces of 
evidence. H e m  afre third line of (T2) is used to transform 
the MD's in (C2b) into their corresponding Bayesian 
' 6  . images." For example, MD(hle,) is transformed into 
(P(hle , ) -  P(h))/- P(h). The proof proceeds by carrying 
out this transformation throughout the left side and the 
right side of (C2b) which, after several algebraic manipula- 
tions, becomes Bayes rule (4) for computing the posterior 
belief in h in light of the ratio-form conditional indepen- 
dent e~idence (e,, e,). 
sk ~ ~ k - 1 '  rk.g2(bk)- (16) 
Equations (15) and (16) are called discounting and ac- 
cretion models, respectively. Taken together, (15) and (16) 
is a sequential anchoring-and-adjustment calculus that can 
be parameterized to reflect various behavioral assump- 
tions. In particular, the following parameters need to be 
specified: 
wk adjustment factor for negative evidence at step 
k ,  
'k adjustment factor for positive evidence at step 
k, 
gl(a,) subjective evaluation of the kth negative clue, 
g2(bk) subjective evaluation of the kth positive clue. 
Einhorn and Hogarth made the following assumptions: 
wk = a .  Sk - and rk = P .  (1 - Sk - ,). Their rationale is as 
follows: a and ,l3 are constants of proportionality, measur- 
ing one's sensitivity to new evidence or, alternatively, one's 
propensity to change current opinions. This propensity is 
also influenced dynamically by the current belief Sk-, or 
the anchor, as follows: negative evidence is discounted 
more when the current belief is large, whereas positive 
evidence is inflated when the current belief is small. Ein- 
horn and Hogarth also specified the functions gl(ak) and- 
g2(bk), but it turns out that this level of detail is unneces- 
sary for our analysis, so we ignore it fpr the sake of 
generality. Thus we will focus on the following belief-up- 
date model: 
Definition 6: Let I,, be the language whose syntax 
consists of (g,(ak), g2(bk)) and whose calculus consists of 
(C3)- 
A. Bayesian Interpretation of the CI Language 
Before presenting of the Bayesian interpretation of LC,, 
it is appropriate to step back and reflect on the nature of 
this analysis. It is important to remember that the whole 
purpose of the descriptive CI I m ~ g e  is to account for 
systematic violations of the Bayesian belief-update model. 
It thus seems circular to map L,, on LC,. At the same 
time, this exercise is important because it puts the finger 
precisely on where the former stops and where the latter 
takes over. It thus shows explicitly in what ways the CI 
language extends the Bayesian limguage. 
The Bayesian interpretation of the @I: language will be 
derived indirectly. Fmt, we give a plausible interpretation 
which grants an isomorphism between the CL and the CF 
languages. We then use the transitivity part of Corollary 1, 
combined with the Bayesian interpretation of the CF lan- 
guage, to derive a (compound) Bayesian interpretation for 
the CI language. 
Assume that at stage k - 1 one holds a prior belief Sk-, 
in a hypothesis h and that a new clue ek-l becomes 
available, carrying a negative evidential impact a,-,. After 
the belief Sk -, is updated to Sk- ,, a new negative clue ek 
becomes available, carrying a negative impact a,, and the 
final belief Sk is established. Now consider the following 
mapping: 
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evidence, consider the following mapping: 
The justification of the mapping (T3) is as follows: 
negative and postive impacts in the CF language map 
precisely on their subjective perceptions in the CI lan- 
guage. Compound CF impacts map on normalized net 
increases in belief in the C1 language. Interestingly, it can 
be shown that the mapping (T3), along with the alterna- 
tive, Bayesian interpretation of the CI syntax Sk-, = P(h) 
and Sk = P(hjek), jointly impIy the Bayesian interpreta- 
tion s f  c e r ~ a b ~ y  factors (T2) discussed in the previous 
section. This curious relationship will become clearer in 
tSae find discussion section, 
We now prewed to show that the mapping (T3) : LC, -, 
LC, is an isomorphism between the two-valued CF lan- 
guage and LC,. 
B. Implications 
Lemma 3: The mapping (T3a) transforms the MD-com- 
bination rule for negative evidence (C2b) into the CI-dis- 
counting rule (C3a) with a = 1. 
Prwf.. g out the mapping (T3a) through the 
MD-combination rule (C2b) gives 
which is equivalent (after several algebraic manipulations) ! 
to 
which, in turn, is equivalent to 
and it is easy to show that (19) is the compound impact of 
a two-staged contrast/inertia accretion model (with a = 1) 
sk - l=sk-2 -  sk-2.gl(ak-1) Go) 
Sk = Sk-l - Sk-l'gl(ak>* (21) 
Lemma 4: The mapping (T3b) transforms the MB-com- 
bination rule (C2a) into the CI accretion rule (C3b) with 
/3 =l. 
Proof: the proof is similar to that of Lemma 3, and we 
leave it as an exercise for the reader. 
Theorem 2: LcF is isomorphic to LC* (with a = P = 1) 
under the mapping (T3) : LC* + LCF. 
Repeating the previous scenario with two positive pieces of 
Proof: the theorem is a direct consequence of Lemmas 
3 and 4. 
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Returning to the (T3) mapping, we note that by fixing Consider the set of propositions 8. A function be1 : 2' -, 
the prior belief parameter Sk-, the mapping can be in- [O,1] is said to be a Shafer belief function7 if 
verted into what we denote (T3)&: LcI + LCF. This gives 
us the following lemma and theorem which follow from 1) bel(0) = 0, 
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 21 be1(81= 1. 
. ,  . 
Lemma 5: Lo is isomorphic to LC, under (T3);:-2: 3) for every rn > O and for every collection of subsets A,,-.-,Amof @,if A l n  n A , = 0 ,  then bel(Al 
LCI + L ~ ~ -  U -.. u A,)&bel(A,)+ -.. +bel(A,). 
Theorem 3: LcI is isomorphic to LBayes under the com- 
pound Bayesian interpretation ((T3);:-2 oT2) : L,, -, The inference problem (h, e,; . ., e,) discussed in this 
LCI. paper has the following Shaferian interpretation. The hy- 
Note that the requirement that a = /3 -1 under a 
Bayesian intepretigtion is not suqFishg. ?his is consisreart 
with the standard Bayesian g&&ghe that negative and 
positive evidence should be wei&& qu&y in tern of 
their impacts on posterior beliefs. 
I VII. THE DEMPSTER-SHAFER B- LANGUAGE 
'The reader should not confuse Sharer's belief function be1 with the 
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pothesis h corresponds to the dichotomous frame 19 = 
{h, $1, and 2'= { 0 , { h ) ,  ($1, {h, $1). The assignment 
of belid to h is extended to an assignment of degrees of 
belief to each member of 26: By definition, be1 ( 0 )  and 
W(Eh,  %I) are O and 1, respectively. Then there exist two 
numbers a, & E [O, IF, with k l ( ( k ) )  = a, be]({$ )) = b, and 
a + b f l .  The set of clues (el; - - ,em)  corresponds to n 
independent evidential sources (e.g., expert opinions or 
pieces of evidence) that support h through the n simple 
support functions bell,. . ., bel, : 2' -, [O, 11, defined as fol- 
lows: 
Given an exhaustive set of mutui4dly excEusive proposi- 
tions ("frame of g&.~emment'? 9, Shafer defines a belief 
function that assigns degrees of befief to ewery element in 
the power set 2', extending the notion of probability which 
is deflned over 8 only. Two or more belief functions 
be],. be], : 2' -, [@,I] may be combined through Dempster's 
rule. yielding a compound belief function @el,@ bel,) : 
2@ --, [O. 11. Unlike pmhbiities, belief functions are subad- 
ditive. That is, the definition of a belief function is consis- 
tent R ith the property bc:1(h)+bel[%) d 1, and the quan- 
tity 1 - be1 (h) - be](%) is defined qliciidy as the degree 
of or unconmmitted belief associated with the proposition 
h.  Note that although Shafer describes belief as a single- 
place function bel(h), he really means this to be a short- 
hand notation for bel(hlE), E being a relevant body of 
evidence (which may be empty). We wi l l  adopt this abbre- 
viated notation as welL6 
The Dempster-Sbafer {DS) language is well-suited for 
nondetermlnistic expert system for 8 rmumber of reasons. 
Accordlnp to Shafer 1491, the themy lends itself n i d y  to 
inferential problems in which the prior probabilities of 
hypotheseq are unavailable. Second, Shafer proposed that 
the predirnre nature of the degree of belief be1 (h le) is 
often more intuitively appealing than its causal counter- 
part P(e ih) .  which is used in most Bayesian inference 
s!sterns. Third, Dempster's rule is viewed by many practi- 
tioners as a belief calculus that operates on belief intervals 
rather than on point probabilities (Spiegelhalter [56]). In- 
deed. Shafer has shown that his degree of belief bel(h) 
Conesponds to a belief interval [bel(h), P*(h)] where 
* ' ( A )  = 1 - beg(&) is the upper probability of h, and, 
funhermore. if be1 = P* then be1 is a probability. Hence 
'he DS language is viewed as a mechanism that enables an 
s!'stem to represent, combine, and propagate inter- 
point. and uncommitted beliefs in hypotheses. 
Simple support functions consist of a special case of 
belief functions (Shafer [50]). A simple support function 
be1 is focused only on one element in the frame of discern- 
ment. That is, be1 awards a positive degree of belief to one 
elemem in the frame and zero belief to any other element. 
belief funcl;ions might be combined through Dempster's 
rule, which is commutative and associative. If there are 
more then two belief functions, the rule can be applied 
repetitively. Hence we can resort once again to the simple 
inference problem (h, el, e,), knowing that the analysis 
can be extended to any finite n > 2. We model this infer- 
ence problem by two simple support functions defined 
over f h,  8)  and focused on h. Now, in general, Dempster's 
rule for combining belief functions is quite complex; how- 
ever, in the case of two (and, in fact, n) simple support 
functions and a dichotomous frame of discernment, 
Dempster's rule reduces to, for every x E 2(h3h), 
and it is easy to show that the resulting be1 is a simple 
support function defined over {h, $1 and focused on h. 
Definition 7: Let LDS be the belief language whose 
syntax consists of simple support functions and whose 
calculus consists of Dempster's rule (C4). LDS will be 
sometimes referred to as the simple DS language. 
We conclude this section with the definition of an addi- 
tive weights of evidence language discussed by Good [21] 
7There are other ways to define belief functions. See Shafer [50]. 
and referred to by Shafer [SO]. The relationship between 
this language and the present analysis will become clearer 
shortly. 
Definition 8: Let L, be the belief language whose syn- 
tax consists of degrees of belief bei(hle,) = w, with w, E 
[0, a ]  and whose calculus consists of the additive combina- 
tion rule W = wl + . - . + w,,. 
A. A Bayesian Interpretation to the i)S Language 
Shafer has argued that 1) belief functions are extensions 
of Bayesian probabilities, and 2) Bayes' rule is a special 
case of Dempster's rule. Several Bayesian writers have 
tried to prove preciw1y the opposite. Lindley's [341 line of 
attack is based on the premise that prob&%ty can replace 
belief functions by mastipalatkg ahe visaeke design of 
the problem in question. Kyburg 1311 has shown that a 
belief function can be represented through a convex set of 
classical probability functions. He then went on show 
that the probability intends of the DS Ianguage are a 
special case of the intervals that result from Bayesian 
updating on uncertain evidence. Baron [5] has shown that 
the class of simple support functions can be cast in a 
Bayesian Ianguage using the notion of ambiguity (Einhorn 
and Hogarth [IS]) such that "ignorance" on h is repre- 
sented through a second order probability &(P(h)r). 
Shafer [50] proposed an intuitively appealing interpreta- 
tion of simple belief functions based on the proximity 
between LDS and L,. More specifically, Shafer has shown 
that if a) Dempster rule is taken for granted, and b) 
weights of evidence combhe additivejy, then the following 
relationship must exist between the belief function bel: 
2* -, [0,1] and the weight of evidence function w: 8 -+ 
[O, 001: 
bel =I-eC'". (23) 
Since the uni.t of meipsurement fox %be weights of evidence 
is arbitrary, Shafer proceeded to set c = - 1 to obtain 
The Bayesian literature is rife with "weights of evidence" 
analyses, and Good [20] cites 33 papers on the subject. 
Turing proposed the following interpretation to the weight 
of evidence w carried by a clue e to a hypothesis h: 
O(hle) 
w = log- =log ~ ( h l e ) / ~ ( $ l e )  + (T5) 
O(h) ~ ( h ) / ~ ( i )  
The following section presents a Bayesian interpretation 
of the simple DS Ianguage that establishes an isomorphism 
between Dempster's rule and Bayes' rule. This interpreta- 
tion is a product of two interpretations, (T4) and (T5). The 
first half of this analysis is due to Shafer, who proposed 
the linkage (T4) between LDs and L,. We go one step 
further and observe that LDs is isomorphic not only to L, 
but also to the Bayesian language LBayes. 
B. Implications I 
Theorem 4 (Shafer): LDs is isomorphic to L, under 
(T4) : L 4 LDs. I 
Proof: Let bell and bel, be two simple support func- 
tions emanating from two evidential sources el and e2 and 
focused on a hypothesis h. Let w, and w2 be the cone- 
sponding weights of evidence carried by el and e, to h.  
Carrying out the mapping (T4) through Dempster's rule 
(C4) gives 
which after several algebraic manipulations, is equivalent 
to I 
which is quivalgnt to w = w, + w2, yielding an isomor- 
phism between LDs and L,. I 
Theorem 5: L, is isomorphic to L,,,,, under the 
Bayesian interpretation (T5) : L,, -+ L ,. I 
Proof: We begin by noting that (T5) is indeed a 
Bayesian interpretation mapping ~ ( e  1 h ) / ~ ( e  l i )  on w by 
virtue of Bayes rule: 
O(hle) ~ ( h l e ) / ~ ( i l e )  i 
w, = log -= P(elh) j log P ( ~ ) / P ( x )  = log -0 0 )  ~ ( e l h )  ' I 
Thus carrying out (T5) through the left and right sides of 
the additive calculus W = w1 + w, gives 
O(hle1, e2) P(e1lh) P(e2lh) (27) 
log O(h)  = log p(e1li) +log ~ ( e , l h )  
which, after an antilogarithmic transformation, gives 
Multiplying both sides by O(h) = P( h)/P(h) gives the 
Bayesian calculus: 
Theorem 6: LDs is isomorphic :a L,,,,, under the com- 
pound Bayesian interpretation (T5) 0 (T4) : L 
-+ I" DS. 
Proof: The proof follows from Theorems 4, 5, and 
Corollary 1. 
VIII. DISCUSSION 
This paper has given an integrated Bayesian analysis of 
important dialects of the certainty factors, Dempster- 
Shafer, and the contrast/inertia belief languages. Before 
proceeding any further, we remind the reader that all the 
findings reported are restricted to the dialects described 
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explicitly in Definitions 5, 6, and 7. These dialects are 
significant in that they form the nucleus of their corre- 
sponding languages. At the same time, one cannot extrapo- 
late the Bayesian interpretations presented into a compre- 
hensive statement about the Bayesian rationality of the 
overall languages. However, tbese dialects and interpreta- 
tions provide a good point of d e F u r i :  for a complete 
analysis of the underlying Ianguages. Ha* d e  this 
disclaimer, we may depict the crux of #he paper symboli- 
cally (Fig. 1). 
The nodes in Fig. 1 represent belief languages, and the 
arcs connecting nodes L, and L, represents the mapping 5,: L, -, L,. Each of these arcs corresponds to a mapping 
d~scussed in the paper. For example, the node connecting 
LC, and L,,,,, represents the (T2) mapping discussed in 
Section V-A. The arcs are bidirectional to reflect the 
observation that each of the mappings d i s c d  in t b  
paper can be made unique and lizvertible by what is 
normally termed the prior belief. For example, given the 
mapping (T2) : L,,,,, -, LCF, knowledge of the Bayesian 
prior belief P ( h )  grants the existence of the inverse map- 
ping (T'2);) : LCF + LBayer. Some authors have argued 
that the DS and the CF languages do not require the 
specification of prior beliefs. We see that this assertion 
does not hold up under a Bayesian interpretation of these 
languages. In other words, for these languages to be "ra- 
tional" on Bayesian grounds, one must be able to specify 
the prior belief in hypotheses. 
The dotted arc in Fig. 1 describes one missing piece in 
the analysis, namely, the direct relationship betwee-n the 
certainty factors and the Dempster-Shafer languages. 'This 
l i i a g e  was established by Gordon and Shortliffe [22], who 
have shown that the CF calculus is a special case of 
Dempster's rule. This mapping between LCF and L,, 
completes the picture, so to speak, leading to two impor- 
tant observations. 
First, we note that by, virtue of Corollary 1 and Fig. 1, 
there exist (compound) plausible mappings that yield iso- 
morphisms between each pair of the languages LCF, LCI, 
and L,,, and, furthermore, that all these languages are 
isomorphic to the Bayesian language LBayes. This means 
that at least on normative Bayesian grounds, these lan- 
guages a) are equivalent and b) achieve no more than the 
classical belief language LBayes, which is restricted to 
ratio-form conditionally independent inference problems. 
The latter constraint is explicit in LBayes and in the Demp- 
ster-Shafer language but is implicit in the CF and in the 
contrast/inertia languages. This limitation is quite discon- 
certing, as real-life inference problems are rarely modular. 
Moreover, simple assumptions of conditional indepen- 
dence often make belief-update schemes with multiple 
hypotheses too restrictive to be useful (Johnson [29]). 
Going back to the isomorphism issues, it is intriguing to 
see that important dialects of different belief languages 
coming from the quarters of computer science (LCF), 
psychology (LC.), and statistics (L,,) are all equivalent to 
a special case of the Bayesian language. This realization 
might lead to two different reactions. On the one hand, 
one is tempted to concur with Lindley 1341 that "the only 
satisfactory description of uncertainty is (Bayesian) proba- 
bility." On the other hand, there is no doubt that each 
belief language represents a unique cognitive challenge in 
terms of knowledge elicitation, and, viewed in this way, 
their tight normative proximity is in fact reassurance. In 
other words, different but isomorphic belief Ianguages 
provide knowledge engineers with a rich variety of tools 
designed .to represent the same phenomena 
With that in mind, future research may proceed in three 
directicuas. Starling with @he nornative ground, we reiter- 
ate the fact that the didects LcF, La and LDs are all 
special cases of their respective languages. Having shown 
that these dialects are remarkably Bayesian, future claims 
that a belief language can accomplish what L,,,,, cannot 
must be sought within extensions of these dialects. For 
le, an important normative contribution will be an 
attempt. to describe and deal with correlated evidence 
outside the Bayesian language. 
Efforts to develop and understand belief languages will 
be incomplete unless their cognitive or descriptive dimen- 
sion receives serious attention. This experimental line of 
research can take two forms. Some researchers, e.g., 
Mtchell I361 and Schocken [48], have compared the valid- 
ity of the recommendations generated by inference systems 
lhaf were fed with degrees of belief provided by human 
experts. By keeping the human subjects constant, and 
varying the belief language "treatments," one can carry 
out statisticd tests on the external validity of alternative 
belief languages. A second line of research, e.g. Wise (591 
and Yadrick et al. 1601, focuses on similar comparisons 
which were based on simulated, rather than human-sup- 
plied, degrees of belief. The former approach offers better 
proximity to realistic knowledge engineering settings; the 
latter enables one to generate worst-case data-sets that are 
difficult to detect with human subjects. Clearly, the two 
approaches are equally valid and complement each other. 
Finally, a precriptive line of research must emerge. This 
effort will focus on how findings from normative and 
cognitive studies may be put to use in practice. This may 
promote a synthetic approach to knowledge engineering, 
i.e., one that combines attractive descriptive features of 
one language with the normative rigor of another. 
[I] J. B. Adams, "Probabilistic reasoning and certainty factors," in 
Rule-Based Expert Systems, B. G.  Buchanan and E. H. Shortliffe, 
Ed. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1984, pp. 263-271. 
1120 lEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, M4N, AND CYBERNETICS, VOL. 19, NO. 5. SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1989 
N. H. Anderson, Foundations of Information Integration Theory. 
New York: Academic, 1981. 
J. F. Baldwin and M. R. M. Monk, "SLOP-A system for support 
logic programming," Univ. of Bristol, 1.T.R.C. Res. Rep., 1986. 
J. Baron, Rationality and Intelligence. Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1985. 
, "Second-order probabilities and belief functions," Theory 
Decision, vol. 22, 1987. 
B. G. Buchanan and E. H. Shortliffe, "Uncertainty and evidential 
support," in Rule-Based Expert System, B. G. Buchanan and E. H. 
Shortliffe. Eds. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1984. 
R. Carnap, Logical Foundafiow of Probability. Chicago, IL: Univ. 
of Chicago Press, 1954. 
E. Charniak, "The Bayesian basis of common sense medical diag- 
nosis," in Proc. Not. Conf. Artifical Intelligence, 1983, pp. 70-73. 
P. Cheeseman, "A method of computing generalized bayesian prob- 
ability values for expert systems," in Proc. 8th Int. Joint Conj. 
Art-fied fnt&gence, 1983. 
G. F .  Cooper, " NESTOR A compu ter-based medical diagnosis aid 
that integrates casual and probabiitie knowledge," Ph.D. disserta- 
tion, Stanford Univ., Stanford, CA, 1984. 
, "Probabilistic inference using belief networks is NP-hard," 
Medical Computer Science Group, Knowledge Systems Lab. Stan- 
ford Univ., Stanford, CA, Tech. Rep. KSL-87-27, 1987. 
R. Cox, "Probability, frequency and reasonable expectation," Amer. 
J. Phys., vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 1-13, 1946. 
B. de Finetti, Probability, Induction and Sfatisria: The Art of 
Guessing. New York: Wiley, 1972. 
R. 0. Duda, P. E. Hart, and N. J. Nils- "'Development of a 
mnlpuher -bd  consultant for mineral exploration," Stanford Res 
Inst., T& Rep., bees~atlonal Projects 5821 and 6415, 1 9 n .  
R. 0. Duda aod E. R Srmliffe, '"pert systems research," 
Science, vol. 220, 261-268,1981. 
W. Edwards, "Conservatism in human information processing," in 
Formal Representation of Human Judgment, B. Kleinmuntz, Ed. 
New York: Wiley, 1968. 
W. Edwards, H. Lindman, and L. J. Savage, "Bayesian statistical 
inference for psychological research," Psychol. Rev., v01. 70, pp. 
193-242.1963- 
H. J. Einhorn aod R. M. Hogartk, "Ambiguity and uncertainty in 
probabilistic infemxce," Psyched. Ibeu., vol. 92, pp. 433-461, 1985. 
, "A contrast/surprise model for lytdating beliefs," Univ. 
Chicago, CCbieago, IL, Tech. Rep., 1987. 
I. J. Good, Good Thinking. University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 
, Probability and the Weighing 4 Euidence. New Y d :  
Hafner, 1950. 
J. Gordon and E. H. Shortliffe, "The Dempster Shafer theory of 
evidence," in Rule-Based Expert System, B. G. Buchanan and E. 
H. Shortliffe, Ed. Reading, MA: Addim-Wesley, 19M, pp. 
272-294. 
B. N. Grwf,  '"Evidential infonnation as transformed pmbability," 
in Uncertuinty in Ar?i&iai frrreiiiigence, J. F .  Lemma and L. Land, 
Eds. Amsterdam, Ihe NeWands:  No& HoE~I& 8936, pp. 
272-294. 
I. Hacking, The Emergence of Prohbiiity. Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1975. 
P. Hajek, "Combining functions for certainty degrees in consulting 
systems," Int. J .  Man- Machine Studies, vol. 22, pp. 59-76, 1985. 
D. E. Heckerman, "Probabilistic interpretation for Mycin's cer- 
tainty factors," in Uncertainly in Artificial Intelligence, J. F. Lemmer 
and L. Kanal, Eds. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North Holland, 
1986. 
E. J. Horvitz, D. E. Heckerman, and C. P. Langlotz, "A framework 
for comparing alternative formalisms for plausible reasoning," in 
Proc. AAAf Conf., Philadelphia, PA, 1986, pp. 210-214. 
R. A. Howard and J. E. Matheson, "Influence diagrams," in 
Reading on the Principles and Applicatiow of Decision Analysis, 
R. A. Howard and J. E. Matheson, Eds. Strategic Decisions Group, 
Menlo Park CA, 1981, pp. 721-762. 
R. Johnson, "Independence and bayesian updating methods," in 
Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, L. Kanal and J. Lemmer, Eds. 
New York: North Holland, 1986, pp. 197-201. 
A. Koriat, S.  Lichtenstein, and B. Fischhoff, "Reasons for confi- 
dence," J .  Experimental Psychol. Human Learning and Memory, 
vol. 6, pp. 107-118, 1980. 
H. E. Kyburg, "Bayesian and non-bayesian evidential updating," 
Artificial Intell~gence, vol. 31, pp. 271-293, 1987. 
C. Langlotz, E. Shortliffe, and L. Fagan, "Using decision theory to 
justify heuristics," in Proc. AAAI Conf., Philadelphia, PA. 1986. 
pp. 215-219. 
J. Lemmer, "Generalized bayesian updating of incompletely speci- 
fied distributions," in Large Scale Systems 5, New York: Elsevier. 
1983. 
D. V. Lindley, "The probability approach to the treatment of 
uncertainty in artificial intelligence and expert systems," Statist. 
Sci., vol. 2, pp. 17-24, 1987. 
L. L. Lopes, "Averaging rules and adjustment processes: The role 
of averaging in inference," Dept. of Psychoi. Univ. of Wisconsin. 
Tech. Rep., 1982. 
D. H. Mitchell, "The shape experiment," Northwestern Univ.. 
Tech. Rep.. 1986. 
R. Nisbett and L. Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcom- 
ings of Social Judgment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-HalI, 
1980. 
R. E. Nisbett, H. Zukier, and R. E. Lemley, "The dilution effect: 
nondiagnostic information weakens the implications of diagnostic 
infonnation," Cognitive Psvchol., vol. 13. pp. 248-277, 1981. 
P. K m a  and D. King, Expert System. New York: Wiley, 
1985. 
J. Pearl, "'Fusim prqagai~on and structuring in belief networks," 
Artificial Intell., Sept., 1986. 
, Probabilisdc Reasoning in Intelligent Systems. Morgan- 
Kauffman, 1988. 
C. S. Peirce, "The probability of induction," W d d  Math., vol. 2, 
pp. 1341-1354.1954. 
H. E. Pople, Jr., "The formation of composite hypotheses in 
diagnostic pmblen, solving: an exercise in synthetic reasoning," in 
Pmc. 3rh let. lclinr Conf. Arrificial Intelligence, Cambridge, MA, 
1987, pp. 1030- 1037. 
K R Popper, "Corroboration, the weight of evidence," in The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York: Scientific Editions, 1959, 
pp. 387-419. 
H. Raiffa, Decision Analvsis. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 
1968. 
F. P. Ramsey, "Truth and probability," in The Foundatiom of 
Mathematics and Other Logical Essa.vs, R. B. Braithwaite. Ed. New 
York: Scientific Editions, 1931. 
L. J. Savage, The Foundations of Sratirtics. New York: Wiley, 
1954. 
S. Schocken, Quasi-Probabilistic Inference in Expert S,vstem: A 
Critical Review (working title). Washington, D.C.: ICIT Press, in 
press. 
G. Shafer, "Jeffrey's rule of conditioning," Phil. Sci., pp. 337-362, 
Sept. 1981. 
, A Marhematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton, NJ: Prince- 
ton Univ. Press, 1976. 
G. ShaEer and A. Tversky, "Languages and designs for probability 
&dpenfff  C0gnjrjr.e Scj., vol. 9,  pp. 309-339. 1985. 
P. Shesloy and G.  Shafer, "Propagating belief functions with local 
computations," IEEE Expert, vol. I ,  pp. 43-52, 1986. 
E. H. Shortliffe, Cornpure?-bed Mebrcnl C(yp~ulrm'on: MYCIN. 
New Ymk: American Elsevier, 1976. 
P. Slovic and S. Lichtenstein, "Comparison of bayesian and regres- 
sion approaches to the study of information processing in judg- 
ment," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, vol. 6, pp. 
649-744, 1971. 
M. Snyder and W. B. Swann, "Hypothesis testing processes in 
social interaction," J .  Personaliw and Social Ps.vchol., vol. 36, pp. 
1202-1212,1978. 
D. J. Spiegelhalter, "Rejoiner to probabilistic expert systems in 
medicine: practical issues in handling uncertainty," Statist. Sci., 
vol. 2, pp. 43-44, 1987. 
A. Tversky and D. Khaneman. "Judgment under uncertainty: 
Heuristics and biases," Science, vol. 185, pp. 1124-1131, 1974. 
W. van Melle, E. H. Shortliffe, and B. G. Buchanan. "Emycin: A 
knowledge-engineer's tool for constructing rule-based expert sys- 
tems," in Rule-Based Expert Systems, E. H. Shortliffe and B. G. 
Buchanan, Eds. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1984, pp. 
302-313. 
B. P. Wise, "Experimentally comparing uncertain inference systems 
in probability," in L'ncertaintv in Artificial Intelltgence 2,  J .  F .  
Lemmer and L. Kanal, Eds. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North 
Holland, 1988, pp. 89-102. 
SCHOCKEN A N D  KLEINDOWER: A R n F l C I A L  IMZLLlGENCE DIALECTS OF BAYFSlAN BELIEF KEVISiGlI LANGUAGE 1121 
1601 R. M. Yadrjck, B. M. Pemn, D. S. Vaughan, P. D. Holden, and Dr. Schocken received the Best Doctoral Dissertation Award in the 
K. G. Kempf, "Evaluation of uncertain inference models I prospec- information systems field from the International Center of Information 
tor, in Uncerraint?; in Artificial Intelligence 2, J .  F. Lemmer and L. Technology in 1987. 
Kanal, Eds. Amsterdam. The Netherlands: North Holland, 1988, 
pp. 77-88. 
Shimon Schocken received the Ph.D. degree in 
decision sciences from the Wharton School, Uni- 
versity of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, in 1987. 
He is an Assistant Professor of Information 
Systems at the Leonard N. Stem School of Busi- 
ness of New York University, New York. His 
research interests focus on the nexus of decision 
theory and artificial intelligence. 
Paul R. Kleindorfer received the Ph.D. degree 
from Camegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, 
PA, in 1970. 
He was on the faculty of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, the International Insti- 
tute of Applied Systems Analysis, Vienna, Aus- 
tria, and the University of Pennsylvania. He is 
currently Vice Dean and Professor of Decision 
Sciences and Economics at the Whanon School 
of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
He has published more than 50 paDers and six 
books in the areas of decision iheory, operations research: and public 
policy. He is Associate Editor of Managernenr Science and the Naval 
Research LD$(I~Jcs Qurrrrer!~. 
